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China, America and International 
Financial Readjustment 
In respect of measures calculated to ameliorate the 
present situation of China by action of the Conference on 
the Limitation of Armaments and Pacific Ocean and Far 
Eastern Questions, two points have been suggested: 
(a) An undertaking by the Powers to proceed without 
delay to readjust all foreign "concessions" in China 
in accordance with the Principles already agreed 
to by the Conference, viz: the Ten Proposals of 
China, and the Four Proposals of the American 
Government. 
(b) China's foreign financial obligations to be placed in 
the same category as other international endebted-
ness in case there hereafter is a readjustment of 
same, or an international moratorium. 
The meaning of these suggestions perhaps requires some 
elucidation. The essence of them is that in case there is an 
international conference, or commission, convened to ex-
amine, ascertain the equities of, and to readjust interna-
tional credits and obligations with a view of restoring and 
stabilizing industry and commerce, that China's foreign ob-
ligations and commitments of an economic character will be 
included within the purview of such a Conference and of its 
acts. 
It is likely that such a Conference will be called soon; 
probably within a short time after the Armaments and 
Far East Conference has adjourned. The American Gov-
ernment so far has declined suggestions that the Arma-
ments and Far East Conference would discuss interna-
tional finances; it has refused to commit itself regarding 
the debts due to the United States by other Powers until the 
positions of those Powers visavis armaments and Pacific 
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Ocean and Far Eastern questions are disclosed. But the 
question of a readjustment or liquidation of international 
financial obligations remains suspended among the greater 
issues that demand prompt action. 
In respect of this question of international financial 
liquidation the United States holds the key. There can be 
no readjustment except with the consent of the American 
Government, because the American Government is almost 
the only creditor nation among the Powers. All of the 
Powers except Japan owe vast amounts to the United States 
which they cannot pay now, and which it may be that they 
never will be able to satisfy in terms of finance. But the 
same general Rule applies to international debts which 
applies to corporation and private debts. If a debtor can-
not pay in money, whatever it has in the way of property 
is liable to seizure in liquidation. If nations cannot pay 
their debts by financial process, whatever other assets they 
possess thereupon become liable to seizure in liquidation. 
The assets of a nation roughly may be classed as revenues, 
resources and territory. 
The practical application of this Rule to the case of 
China is pertinent. In security for foreign debts China 
has been required to give liens on and supervision of her 
means of revenue, concessions involving her natural re-
sources and communications, and leases of her territory. 
The Rule has been applied to China without abatement in 
principle, although sometimes relaxed in practice. The 
Rule as applied to China is that she must fulfill her foreign 
obligations or surrender some of her assets to foreign ad· 
ministration or control. 
The Rule and Other Nations 
Turn to other nations. If the Rule as applied to China 
be applied to other nations, then in case Great Britain 
and France and Italy (to limit the illustration) do not or 
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cannot pay their debts to the United States, then the Amer-
ican Government legally and morally is justified in demand-
ing other forms of compensation, such as concessions, or 
territory. 
If a private person CANNOT pay his debts it is termed 
baukruptcy: if he WILL NOT pay his debts it is regarded 
as dishonest. 
If a State cannot pay its debts it is insolvent: if a State 
will not pay its debts it is termed repudiation. 
A person who because of misfortune or incompetence or 
oppression cannot pay his debts is entitled to and usually 
obtains sympathy and pity. A person who can but will not 
pay his debts is not entitled to sympathy, and rigorous 
methods to colle~t such debts are considered to be justified. 
There may be sympathy for a weak nation which cannot 
pay its debts, but is willing to pay them. But a ·Power 
which cannot pay its debts thereby raises presumptions 
against its pretentions of being a Power. A Power which 
will not pay its debts should be made to pay them or lose 
its rating as a Power, and if it has any assets they should 
be taken in liquidation of the debts. 
Many nations are in debt to the United States now; but 
for purpose of illustration I will confine comparisons to the 
principal debtor Powers and to those nations which have 
"interests" or possessions in the Far East and China. This 
is not intended as a mathematical demonstration; therefore 
the figures used are not presented as accurate, although 
they approximate the real figures. 
Roughly, nations which are participating in the 
Armaments and Far East Conference owe the United 
States Government $12,000,000,000 principal and interest. 
A recent published statement showed that over $1,000,-
000,000 arrears of interest is due, and the debtor nations 
are falling in arrears of interests at the rate of about 
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$1,700,000 a day. What this means to the United States 
may be comprehended by saying that if these debts were 
paid now the American people need pay no national taxes 
for four or five years; or the United States could build a 
navy equal to the combined navies of Great Britain and 
Japan and still have to collect no taxes for three years. 
Recently the Chinese Central Government was unable 
to meet on its maturity a small debt to an American Bank; 
whereupon there was much criticism concerning China'.s 
insolvency, and it even was mooted that China's position in 
the Washington Conference would be impaired by the cir-
cumstance. Yet Powers sitting in the same Conference 
owe billions to America on which they are not even paying 
interest, and no suggestion was made that this fact sh9uld 
impair their positions in the Conference. China is restricted 
and cramped in her fiscal administration by conditions im-
posed by those same Powers so that she cannot make her 
revenues meet her costs of administration, and also pay 
heavy indemnity exactions to those same Powers. China 
is hindered by the existence of foreign "concessions" and 
the limitations imposed on her by the "sphere of influence" 
Powers from freely developing her own natural resources 
and building up a modern material prosperity which soon 
would relieve her financial stringency. 
Several suggestions have been advanced regarding the 
liquidation of the debts of the Powers to America. One 
suggestion has the merit of extreme simplicity; it is for the 
American Government to cancel the debts-to make the 
other Powers a present of what they owe us, uncondition-
ally. 
Another suggestion is termed "readjustment." This 
plan is to have all the so-called "Allies" nations mutually 
wipe off their debts to each other. 
Let us examine this readjustment plan. Great Britain 
owes to the United States about $7,000,000,000 and other 
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nations owe Great Britain a little less than that amount. 
Therefore this mutual forgiving of debts would leave Great 
Britain about even on the transaction, and would clear up 
her books; British finance and trade would revive rapidly. 
The readjustment plan has a further advantage for Great 
Britain; she cannot well afford either to become insolvent 
by failing to pay, or to repudiate by refusing to pay her 
debts to America. Great Britain has assets which under 
those circumstances the United States might demand in 
liquidation-Canada for instance. On the other hand, a 
good part of what is due to Great Britain from the other 
"ally" nations may be classed as dubious and perhaps un-
collectable and unrealizable. So by cancelling dubious 
debts Great Britain would relieve herself of a debt to Amer-
ica which is collectable from her in one form or another. 
France, Italy and Belgium each owe more than they 
have debts due them as offsets. Those nations would gain 
hugely by the "wipe off" plan. 
Finance--Political and Economic 
America does not owe anything to other nations. By 
the "wipe off" plan America is the only creditor-she pays 
the whole bill. 
It is argued that it is good "business" for America to 
wipe off these debts, for that will revive foreign trade. If 
we let the other nations off from paying us that money, 
they will be able to buy from America great quantities of 
goods, and industry and commerce will revive quickly. 
There is something in that argument: but to the writer it 
is not altogether clear that America surely will profit by 
the deal. In ordinary trading, if one has goods to sell and 
gives a prospective customer the money with which to buy 
one's goods, it amounts to the same thing as giving him the 
goods; and if after one has given away the money, the cus-
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tomer goes across the street and buys in another store, that, 
as Abe Potash would say, "is something else again." It 
might be that a part of or all of the capital thus restored to 
other nations would be used to build up and extend their 
economic communications with other countries in compe-
tition with American trade. It even might be used to de-
velop the "interests" of those nations in China under their 
"sphere of influence" system, to the relegation of the Open-
Door and the handicapping of American opportunity in 
China. 
There is something to be said for the policy of "wipe 
off" in business; of liquidation, of cleaning things up and 
taking a fresh start. It may be a good thing all around to 
accept a man's plea in bankruptcy and allow him to begin 
again with a clean slate. But if the creditors learned that 
the bankrupt was buying expensive motor cars, and keep-
ing a mistress and a yacht, they probably would feel differ-
ently toward him. How a bankrupt spends his time and 
his money have a bearing on his claim for leniency and on 
his chances to "make good" afterward. 
There, however, is a fallacy in discussing this question 
of international financial readjustment in economic terms 
exclusively. These debts of the Powers to America were 
not incurred as economic transactions. The debts were 
incurred by the Powers, the loans were made by the United 
States, for political reasons solely. Since political consid-
erations provided the reason for creating the debts, it seems 
to follow logically that political considerations inevitably 
are involved in their liquidation. 
The policy of the American Government and the ideals 
of the American people are opposed to war and to exces-
sive armaments. It properly is argued that the American 
people should not consent to be taxed to maintain excessive 
armaments. Yet it is proposed to present certain Powers 
with a vast amount of money that is due to America when 
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it is known that a great part of it, or its equivalent, will be 
spent on armaments. In order to give this immense amount 
to those nations the American people will have to tax them-
selves that much more. Is there any difference in morals 
between Americans taxing themselves for their own arma-
ments and taxing themselves to pay for the armaments of 
foreign nations? 
Furthermore, by the process of taxing Americans to 
support FOREIGN armaments, it is possible that they may 
be taxing themselves to support armaments which may be 
used to contradict and defeat the liberal policies of the 
American Nation, and to strengthen alliances which under-
mine the security of America. The Anglo-Japanese .Alli-
ance is a case in point. A few days ago Lord N orthcliffe 
telegraphed from China to an American newspaper as fol-
lows: 
"The Anglo-Japanese Alliance is the sharpest 
sword in the hands of the war party of Japan. Under 
the cover of this alliance the war party of Japan spends 
more than half of the people's income on the Navy, 
Army and fortifications. Japan's past arrogant atti-
tude toward the United States w:ould not have been 
possible without this alliance. The Chinese, who de-
test this alliance as much as Americans and the British 
in the Orient do, blame Great Britain for their suffer-
ings at the hands of Japan. One bad result of the 
alliance is the attitude of the war party toward the 
desire of Japanese for real democratic government. 
Owing to the strength of the war party, the right of the 
people to hold public meetings and the freedom of the 
press are at the mercy of police and censors controlled 
by the military party. . . . Kill the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance and you will rob the military party of half 
its power, though they will want watching this year, 
next year, and many years to come." 
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It is announced that the British Government intends to 
spend a large amount on a naval base at Singapore. In 
conjunction with the Japanese naval bases in the Far East, 
American naval operations in those oceans thereby will be 
circumscribed. It is not pretended that Americans have a 
right to dictate to the British Government how it will spend 
its revenues; but Americans have something to say about 
how American revenues will be spent by the British Gov-
ernment in naval combinations which directly affect the 
most important foreign policy of the American Govern-
ment. 
What is called the Hay Doctrine today is the most im-
portant foreign policy of the United States. It has super-
ceded the Monroe Doctrine in importance by reason of world 
developments and tendencies which have diminished the 
dangers apprehended by Monroe and have given growth to 
new and more imminent dangers in the Pacific. The link-
ing of Pacific Ocean and Far East questions with the ques-
tion of limitation of armaments by the American Govern-
ment is a concrete recognition of these changes. 
The fiction that, now that the war _ is over, the huge 
"Allies" debts to America should be treated on a purely 
economic basis and readjusted on that basis should be given 
no credence. Those debts usually are termed "inter-Allies" 
obligations, probably in order to cover them with a veil of 
thoughtless sentiment. Yet there is something in the term 
"inter-Allies obligations" that really is pertinent now. The 
money was loaned to help nations allied with us, or rather 
associated with us in war. All the more reason why theo-
retically it might remain on that basis in any readjustment, 
and not be used to strengthen combinations or to promote 
policies inimical to American security, interests and ideals. 
There is a difference between loans to "Allies," and giving 
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money to nations that are combined with other Powers 
against America or to Powers which oppose the major 
propositions of American foreign policy. 
China and Readjustment 
China's foreign debt roughly can be placed at $1,500,-
000,000. Of this about $350,000,000 is for indemnities; 
mostly due .to the "boxer" disorders in China (1900), and 
the indemnity exacted by Japan after the China-Japan war. 
Incidentally, the United States long ago forgave China the 
part of the "boxer" indemnity allotted to America that re-
mained after legitimate American claims were paid. About 
$250,000,000 is still due to the other ·Powers-Great Bri-
tain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Russia-of that 
"boxer" indemnity. China already has paid more than fair 
compensation (compared with the adjustment regarded as 
equitable by America) for actual damages done to foreign-
ers' life and property by the "boxer" rioters, and still owes 
nearly as much as she did when the indemnities were first 
assessed, because of accrued interest. If the other nations 
would adopt now the policy which America has pursued it 
would be a great relief to China and would help restore her 
fiscal solvency and stability. 
In any readjustment of "inter-Ally" indebtedness Japan 
probably will not be included unless Russia and China are 
brought into the settlement. In this connection it should 
be remembered that China is an "Ally"; having, chiefly on 
the urging of the United States, declared war on Germany 
and Austria in 1917. 
"What a magnificent gesture" remarked a French 
statesman apropos the suggestion that America shall "wipe 
off" what is due her from our former associates in war. 
But the proposal as it is conceived in England and Europe, 
so far as I have observed, is limited to Europe and England 
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in application: it does not include members of the "Allies" 
in Asia. 
Why that limitation? The "wipe off" round robin does 
not include China, it seems. Great Britain is to forgive 
France and Italy and Belgium; France is to forgive Bel-
gium and perhaps Italy (but not Germany); Italy is to for-
give ( ?) ; and America is to forgive them all. 
Except China ! Why except China? 
It is as important to America to establish and maintain 
tranquillity in the Far East and in the Pacific Ocean as it 
is to accomplish those results in Europe. A process which 
perhaps may stabilize one-half of the world while leaving 
the other half unstabilized hardly can be regarded as com-
plete. The American nation faces TWO continents across 
two oceans; and at this moment it is from the Asian conti-
nent and across the Pacific Ocean that the more serious 
portents of danger come. If the American people are to 
forgive to England and Europe (which means tax them-
selves) the sum of twelve billions of dollars, why not make 
the transaction cover our other national exposure by spread-
ing it out a little? 
Suppose the American Government should propose to 
the Powers that they will submit all their monetary claims 
against China and concessions in China from which the 
Chinese want to be relieved and which are contradictory to 
the Open-Door to the appraisal of an international commis-
sion of experts, and when the total amount thus is fixed, to 
credit it against the debts of those nations to America. That 
would reduce the debts of those nations to America, and 
would make China owe it instead. Then if America should 
want to readjust the "inter-Allies" obligations on a "wipe 
off" or any other basis, the process would include China and 
extend t1 e alleged beneficent influence of the action to the 
Far East as well as to Europe. 
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If such a proposal should be made by the American 
Government I rather expect that some of the debtor Powers 
would raise objections; that they will want to "beg off" 
their debts to America, but will not want to be equally rea-
sonable and generous with respect to China's obligations to 
them. Yet it is clear that such a policy and action almost 
immediately would relieve the existing fiscal embarrass-
ment of China, tend to restore tranquility there by remov-
ing the principal causes of international friction in China, 
give a tremendous stimulus to China's commerce and peace-
ful industrial development, and the trade of all foreign 
nations with China. 
And if the American Government should make such a 
proposal to the Powers, and they should decline to assent 
to it, what reasons would they give for so declining? 
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